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Successful Rules on Successive Fixed-Term
Contracts?
Sudabeh KAMANABROU*
In 1999 the European social partners negotiated the framework agreement on fixed-term work
which was then put into effect by Council Directive 1999/70/EC. It contains, inter alia,
measures designed to prevent abuse of successive fixed-term contracts. As the relevant clause of the
agreement is rather loosely framed, its effect on legislative approximation in the EU is debatable.
However, a study of the law on successive fixed-term employment contracts of fifteen
EU Member States showed that legislative approximation in this field of law has largely been
achieved.
1 INTRODUCTION
Council Directive 1999/70/EC concerning the framework agreement on fixed-
term work aims, among others things, to prevent the abuse of successive fixed-
term contracts. The relevant provision is clause 5 of the ETUC-UNICE-CEEP
framework agreement on fixed-term work, which is put into effect by the said
Directive. As the term ‘framework agreement’ suggests, the European require-
ments are formulated rather broadly, leaving a wide margin for national regula-
tions. Opinions on this technique vary. While some authors welcome the
framework agreement as a prudent and wise provision that focuses on the main
issues and refrains from overly rigid regulations,1 others emphasize that it falls far
short of the aims set out in the Commission initiative of 19962 and of earlier
attempts to regulate fixed-term working.3 Lorber has pointed out that the social
partners had the difficult task of striking the right balance between flexibility and
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security. She is not convinced that they fulfilled this task and rightly considers the
loosely framed clause 5 to be a result of controversial negotiations and necessary
concessions.4 The term ‘formulaic compromise’ certainly springs to mind when
comparing clause 5 to the preamble and the general considerations of the frame-
work agreement. Additionally, it should be noted that clause 5 reflects the mea-
sures already adopted in Member States when the agreement was concluded.5
Against this background, it may well have been impossible to achieve a greater
degree of harmonization.
However, since the purpose of Directives is to bring about legislative approx-
imation, the question arises as to whether or not Council Directive 1999/70/EC
ensures such an approximation of the law on successive fixed-term employment
contracts.6 This is particularly relevant since there are several rulings of the
European Court of Justice regarding clause 5 of the framework agreement, show-
ing that the implementation of the Directive in the Member States has not run
entirely smoothly. There are already numerous works on (successive) fixed-term
contracts, some of them with comparative aspects.7 There has been, nevertheless,
no scientific analysis of the legislative approximation brought about by Council
Directive 1999/70/EC. To fill this gap, the law on successive fixed-term contracts
of fifteen EU Member States was analysed by means of a two-year project. This
study, published as a book,8 consists of three parts. First of all it outlines the
European legal framework for successive fixed-term contracts, taking account of
the ECJ’s rulings. Second, it contains detailed country reports on the law of
successive fixed-term contracts in fifteen EU Member States. Last but not least,
it thoroughly analyses and compares the level of protection in the Member States
covered by the project. This essay summarizes the results of the project.
The Member States included in the study are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands,
Poland, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Apart from Poland, these
Member States all belong to the EU 15. Newer Member States were not included
4 Pascale Lorber, Regulating Fixed Term Work in the United Kingdom: A Step Towards Workers’ Protection?,
15 Int’l J. Comp. Lab. L. Indus. Rel.121, 124, 126 (1999).
5 See Rapporteur Karin Jöns, supra n. 2, at 197, 206.
6 See the critical comments of Rapporteur Karin Jöns, supra n. 2, at 197, 206, 207.
7 Among the latter ones are for instance Fixed-Term Employment Contracts (Roger Blanpain & Claire
Grant eds, Vanden Broele Publishers 2009); Regulation of Fixed-Term Employment Contracts (Roger
Blanpain ed., Kluwer Law International 2010), Markus Sädevirta, A Comparative Study of the Regulation
Governing the Use of Fixed-Term Contracts in Three EU Member States (2013), accessible at http://urn.fi/
URN:ISBN:978-952-10-9285-5 (accessed 14 Feb. 2017); Markus Sädevirta, Regulation of Fixed-Term
Employment Contracts in the EU, France, Finland and the United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis, 31 Int’l
J. Comp. Lab. L. Indus. Rel. 207 (2015).
8 Rechtsangleichung im Recht der Kettenbefristung in der EU (Sudabeh Kamanabrou ed., Mohr Siebeck
2016).
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for lack of the necessary language skills of the participants as well as for lack of
(access to) court judgments and literature. However, evidence from the
International Labour Organization employment protection legislation database
shows that the restriction to EU 15 Member States – apart from Poland – does
not result in a distorted picture of the rules on successive fixed-term contracts in
the EU.9 The inclusion of newer Member States would have led to repetitions
rather than to different insights. For example, with regard to the regulatory models
developed below,10 Estonia adopts model 1,11 the Czech Republic adopts model
5,12 and Slovenia adopts models 2 and 4.13
2 CLAUSE 5 OF THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT
ON FIXED-TERM WORK
With regard to successive fixed-term contracts, the framework agreement attempts
to square the circle by aiming at both flexibility and security. Its compromise
nature is evident in the loosely framed clause 5 of the agreement. According to this
provision Member States are required to introduce one or more of the following
measures:
(a) objective reasons justifying the renewal of such contracts or
relationships;
(b) limits on the maximum total duration of successive fixed-term employ-
ment contracts or relationships;
(c) limits on the number of renewals of such contracts or relationships.14
Member States are free to adopt just one of the measures or a combination of
them. They may also define the conditions for classifying fixed-term contracts as
successive.
The rulings of the European Court of Justice concerning clause 5 of the
framework agreement relate to the first of the three measures, the objective reasons
9 Data can be accessed at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/eplex/termdisplay.empContracts?p_lang=en
(accessed 14 Feb. 2017).
10 See infra s. 5.
11 See Paloma Kreet Tupay, Das befristete Arbeitsverhältnis als Ausdruck der Flexicurity nach estnischem Modell,
EuZA 468 (2014).
12 According to the information given by Hurka in July 2013 at http://www.labourlawnetwork.eu/
national%3Cbr%3Elabour_law/national_legislation/legislative_developments/prm/109/v__detail/
id__3178/category__8/index.html (accessed 14 Feb. 2017), the differing ILO data is from 2011.
13 Arts 52 and 53 of the Slovenian Employment Relations Act, unofficial consolidated text accessible via
http://www.mddsz.gov.si/en/legislation/ (accessed 14 Feb. 2017).
14 According to clause 5 of the framework agreement, Member States may instead use equivalent legal
measures to prevent abuse, but this option has not become important in the practice of
implementation.
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justifying the renewal of fixed-term contracts. No rulings on the other two
measures have been handed down yet. This is probably due to the fact that the
term ‘objective reasons’ is open to interpretation while numerical limits as pro-
vided in clause 5 (1) (b) and (c) are not. Clause 5 (1) (a) leaves more room for
questionable reasoning than (b) and (c), thus giving rise to preliminary rulings by
the European Court of Justice. This may be illustrated by some examples. In
Adeneler the ECJ was asked whether it would constitute an objective reason if a
provision of a Member State required the conclusion of a fixed-term contract. The
European Court of Justice answered in the negative.15 In Kücük it dealt with the
question of successive fixed-term contracts to replace temporarily absent employ-
ees. While the repeated use of fixed-term contracts in such cases is not an abuse in
itself, it is the responsibility of the Member State’s authorities to ensure that the
contracts are actually intended to cover temporary needs.16 This last point was
taken up again in Márquez Samohano and Mascolo but not in connection with
temporary replacements.17 Admittedly, in some cases the problem was not so
much one of interpretation but rather one of the public administration being
bound by budgetary rules to use fixed-term contracts, no matter how permanent
the need for the services.18
According to the European Court of Justice, the concept of objective reasons
is to be understood as referring to precise and concrete circumstances which
characterize a given activity and justify the use of successive fixed-term employ-
ment contracts in that particular context. Such circumstances may arise from the
specific nature of the task to be performed by the temporarily employed person. A
legitimate social-policy objective of a Member State may also provide justification
for a fixed-term contract.19 The national provision allowing recourse to fixed-term
contracts has to offer objective and transparent criteria in order to verify whether
the renewal of such contracts actually responds to a genuine need, whether it is
capable of achieving the objective pursued, and whether it is necessary for that
purpose.20 Apart from those requirements, the European Court of Justice ruled
that clause 5 (1) (a) of the framework agreement does not justify the renewal of
15 Case C-212/04, Adeneler, ECR 2006, I-6057, paras 58–75.
16 Case C-586/10, Kücük, NZA 2012, 135, para. 39.
17 Case C-190/13, Márquez Samohano, NZA 2014, 475, para. 59; Case C-22/13, Mascolo, NZA 2015,
153, para. 101.
18 See Case C-16/15, Pérez López, NZA 2016, 1265 and Case C-22/13, Mascolo, NZA 2015, 153.
19 Case C-238/14, Commission/Luxembourg, NZA 2015, 424, para. 44; Case C-22/13, Mascolo, NZA
2015, 153, para. 87; Case C-378/07, Angelidaki, ECR 2009, I-3071, para. 96; Case C-212/04,
Adeneler, ECR 2006, I-6057, paras 69–70.
20 Case C-22/13, Mascolo, NZA 2015, 153, para. 88; Case C-378/07, Angelidaki, ECR 2009, I-3071,
para. 100; Case C-212/04, Adeneler, ECR 2006, I-6057, para. 74.
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fixed-term contracts used to cover permanent needs.21 For example, if fixed-term
contracts are repeatedly used to replace temporarily absent employees, all circum-
stances have to be taken into account to prevent the abuse of fixed-term employ-
ment contracts. Such circumstances include the number of successive contracts
concluded with the same person or for the purposes of performing the same
work.22
As regards interruptions between successive fixed-term contracts, the
European Court of Justice held that Member States may not use their margin of
appreciation to compromise the objective or the practical effect of the framework
agreement.23
All in all, the European level of protection against the abuse of successive
fixed-term contracts is rather low. Clause 5 of the framework agreement lists
measures without setting specific limits. There is no list of objective reasons,
binding or not. There is no effective limit for the maximum duration or the
maximum number of successive fixed-term contracts. Member States are free to
combine the measures alternatively or cumulatively. Thus, the framework agree-
ment leaves room for national provisions with generous terms for successive fixed-
term contracts. Since it was a compromise achieved through European social
dialogue, as stated above in the introductory remarks, it may safely be assumed
that stricter measures were not negotiable. This rather low level of protection has
to be taken as the basis for the analysis of the legislative approximation in the EU
Member States in this study. Against this backdrop, the extent of the legislative
approximation in the Member States is of particular interest.
3 IMPLEMENTATION OF CLAUSE 5 OF THE FRAMEWORK
AGREEMENT IN DIFFERENT MEMBER STATES
It comes as no surprise that implementation of clause 5 of the framework agree-
ment in the Member States covered by the study has turned out differently. Details
are to be found in the aforementioned book.24 Nevertheless, the different kinds of
regulations are outlined under point 5.
The legislative activity in the Member States after the enactment of the
Directive differed.25 In Denmark, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom,
21 Case C-190/13, Márquez Samohano, NZA 2014, 475, para. 55; Case C-22/13, Mascolo, NZA 2015,
153, para. 88; Case C-586/10, Kücük, NZA 2012, 135, para. 36.
22 Case C-586/10, Kücük, NZA 2012, 135, para. 40.
23 Case C-378/07, Angelidaki, ECR 2009, I-3071, para. 155; Case C-212/04, Adeneler, ECR 2006,
I-6057, para. 82.
24 Sudabeh Kamanabrou, supra n. 8. Part 1 § 3 of this book summarizes the country reports, showing
patterns, common features and differences. Part 2 contains the country reports.
25 Sudabeh Kamanabrou, supra n. 8, at 29-31.
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legislative measures were necessary as in these Member States successive fixed-
term contracts had not been limited before implementation of the Directive.
On the other hand, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, the Netherlands and
Sweden had already taken measures against excessive use of successive fixed-
term contracts. These Member States did not have to change their law to
implement clause 5 of the framework agreement. In Germany, Italy, Malta
and Poland, legislative measures were taken which, on the whole, did not
change the hitherto applicable law. In five of the Member States in the study
the law on successive fixed-term contracts was amended after the end of the
transposition period, including Italy, the Netherlands and Poland (in the
period 2014–2016).
The percentage of fixed-term contracts in the Member States also varies
widely. The rates in 2014 ranged from 7.7 % in Malta to 28.3 % in Poland.26 In
the same year, the EU average was 13.9 %.27 It must be borne in mind, though,
that direct conclusions about the successive use of fixed-term contracts cannot be
drawn from this data as it includes all fixed-term contracts, successive contracts as
well as first and isolated fixed-term contracts.
In aiming to restrict successive fixed-term contracts, the fundamental point is
which measure to choose and how to implement it in national law. The three
measures of clause 5 of the framework agreement are used individually as well as in
combination. Cumulative combinations are used as well as alternative combina-
tions. Compared with regulations based on only one measure, cumulative combi-
nations enhance the level of protection, whereas alternative combinations allow a
wider margin for successive fixed-term contracts. Insofar as objective reasons are
part of the national regulation, general clauses are used as well as lists.28 These are
either exhaustive rules or merely lists of examples. The replacement of temporarily
absent employees and a temporary increase in demand for labour are generally
accepted as objective reasons justifying the use of (successive) fixed-term
contracts.29 In Member States that do not (exclusively) adopt objective reasons,
the maximum permissible total duration of successive fixed-term employment
contracts ranges from two to four years. In some cases this maximum duration is
absolute. In other cases the employer may again conclude fixed-term contracts
with the same employee after a suspension or waiting period.30 Not all the
26 http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lfsa_etpga&lang=de (accessed 14 Feb. 2017).
27 Ibid.
28 Sudabeh Kamanabrou, supra n. 8, at 44–45.
29 Ibid., at 45.
30 Ibid., at 35–39, 42–45. Absolute limits are laid down by Italian and Polish law. It must, however, be
kept in mind that the law in both countries changed fairly recently (2014 in Italy, 2016 in Poland). It
remains to be seen how the courts will apply the new regulations.
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Member States adopt rules specifying the conditions under which fixed-term
contracts are to be considered successive.31
In all of the Member States in the study, with the exception of Denmark, an
infringement of the law on successive fixed-term contracts leads to an open-ended
contract.32
4 JOB PROTECTION FOR EMPLOYEES ON OPEN-ENDED
CONTRACTS
The employer’s need for fixed-term contracts depends among other things on
the level of job protection for employees on open-ended contracts. As a
result, the study deals with the circumstances under which the employer
may terminate the contract if the demand for labour diminishes, and the
costs associated with a dismissal. In all the Member States in the study,
operational reasons constitute grounds for dismissal. In essence, the definitions
for operational reasons are similar, but there is a variety of requirements for
the right to continued employment in the same business and the
selection among workers potentially affected by a fall in the demand for
labour.33 The same goes for the legal consequences of dismissals on opera-
tional grounds.
A distinction is to be made between lawful and unlawful termination. In the
case of lawful termination the employee loses his or her job. In more than half of
the Member States covered by the study he or she receives monetary compensa-
tion, for which a certain minimum period of employment is usually an eligibility
requirement.34 In the case of unlawful termination the employment relationship
may be continued, or it may be terminated with a severance payment. These
options are used in a pure form in some Member States while others combine
different options. For example, in France, Ireland and the United Kingdom
continuity of the employment relationship is possible, but it tends to be the
exception.35 In Italy, Spain and Sweden it depends on the employer whether or
not employment is terminated with a severance payment.36 In those Member
States opting for a severance payment, eligibility requirements vary, particularly
31 Sudabeh Kamanabrou, supra n. 8, at 46–51.
32 Ibid., at 54–55.
33 Ibid., at 66–68.
34 Ibid., at 68–70. Monetary compensation is provided by law in the following countries: Austria,
Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. It
is common also in Germany and Poland, even though there is no corresponding regulation.
35 Sudabeh Kamanabrou, supra n. 8, at 71–72.
36 Ibid., at 72–73.
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with regard to the minimum period of employment required, as well as the
amount awarded to the employee.37
The regulations on premature dismissal of a fixed-term employee also
vary. In Belgium, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta and Sweden, fixed-term
contracts cannot lawfully be ended ahead of time.38 In Austria, France,
Germany, Ireland and the United Kingdom, a premature dismissal is permis-
sible only if an individual agreement lays down the right to early
termination.39 The regulations on severance payments on expiration of the
fixed-term contract also vary. In some Member States the employee may be
eligible for such a severance payment, for which it should be noted that in
some cases a considerable minimum period of employment is an eligibility
requirement.40
Comparing the consequences of dismissal on the one hand and the end of a
fixed-term contract on the other, unlawful dismissal turns out to be less favourable
for the employer than the end of a fixed-term contract in nearly all the Member
States covered by the study.41 The British and the Irish law show particular
characteristics as in both countries the end of a fixed-term contract is treated no
differently from a dismissal.42 In most Member States the consequences of the end
of a fixed-term contract correspond with those of lawful dismissal.43 However, in
Denmark, Luxembourg and Spain, lawful dismissal leads to higher-value claims on
the part of the employee than the end of a fixed-term contract,44 whereas in
France the end of a fixed-term contract can cost the employer more than lawful
dismissal.45
37 Ibid., at 74–75.
38 Ibid., at 80–81.
39 Ibid., at 78–81. In Germany, the agreement may also be concluded at the collective level.
40 Sudabeh Kamanabrou, supra n. 8, at 81–82. Severance pay is provided by law in Austria, France,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. In all these countries except Italy and
Spain a waiting period has to be observed.
41 Sudabeh Kamanabrou, supra n. 8, at 83.
42 Tobias Möller & Sudabeh Kamanabrou, Vereinigtes Königreich, in Rechtsangleichung im Recht der
Kettenbefristung in der EU 247 (Sudabeh Kamanabrou ed., Mohr Siebeck 2016); Tobias Möller &
Sudabeh Kamanabrou, Republik Irland, in Rechtsangleichung im Recht der Kettenbefristung in der EU 284
(Sudabeh Kamanabrou ed., Mohr Siebeck 2016).
43 Sudabeh Kamanabrou, supra n. 8, at 83–84.
44 Martina Berenbrinker & Sudabeh Kamanabrou, Dänemark, in Rechtsangleichung im Recht der
Kettenbefristung in der EU 206, 210 (Sudabeh Kamanabrou ed., Mohr Siebeck 2016); Anja
Korth & Sudabeh Kamanabrou, Luxemburg, in Rechtsangleichung im Recht der Kettenbefristung in
der EU 483–484 (Sudabeh Kamanabrou ed., Mohr Siebeck 2016); Sudabeh Kamanabrou,
Spanien, in Rechtsangleichung im Recht der Kettenbefristung in der EU 661–663 (Sudabeh
Kamanabrou ed., Mohr Siebeck 2016).
45 Johanna Intrup-Dopheide, Anja Korth & Sudabeh Kamanabrou, Frankreich, in Rechtsangleichung
im Recht der Kettenbefristung in der EU 531, 533–534 (Sudabeh Kamanabrou ed., Mohr Siebeck
2016).
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5 REGULATORY MODELS FOR THE PREVENTION OF ABUSE
OF SUCCESSIVE FIXED-TERM CONTRACTS
The regulations mentioned under point 3 have specific national features in the
different Member States. The closest resemblances are to be found in the law of
France and Luxembourg on the one hand, and the United Kingdom, Ireland and
Malta on the other. For the purposes of comparison of the regulations, the details
were disregarded. Instead, the regulatory models on which the various regulations
are based were examined.46 As the three measures mentioned in the framework
agreement can be used individually or in a combination, there are a many possible
configurations. However, only eight of them are actually adopted by the Member
States covered by this study. The number of regulatory models compared with a
view to legislative approximation could ultimately be reduced to six, since two of
the eight models are used in just one Member State and only in combination with
other regulatory models. They could thus be disregarded because of their excep-
tional nature.47 Regulatory models 1–3 adopt two of the measures mentioned in
the framework agreement cumulatively. Model 4 adopts only the requirement of
objective reasons. Model 5 resorts to all the measures, combining them partly
cumulatively, partly alternatively. Model 6 combines two measures alternatively.48
Three of the Member States covered by the study adopt more than one regulatory
model, the others limit themselves to just one.49 In the following description, the
models are mentioned in descending order of restrictiveness. As the extent of
restrictiveness cannot be determined in the abstract, the actual design of the models
in the Member States was taken into account in making this assessment.
5.1 MODEL 1
Model 1 combines cumulatively objective reasons and a maximum number of
successive fixed-term contracts. Successive fixed-term contracts need to be justified
by an objective reason and are at the same time restricted in terms of the number of
permissible contract renewals. This model is adopted in France and Luxembourg.50
Both countries limit only the number of renewals, not the number of separate
contracts that are not a renewal of the original contract. However, they restrict the
succession of separate contracts as well, using a measure the framework agreement
46 Sudabeh Kamanabrou, supra n. 8, at 87–119.
47 Ibid., at 88.
48 Ibid., at 88–89.
49 E.g. for the six models and their variations see Sudabeh Kamanabrou, NZA 2016, 385, 387–388. For
details see Sudabeh Kamanabrou, supra n. 8, at 88–93.
50 In France the relevant provisions are Art. L.1242-2 and Art. L.1243-13 Code du travail; in
Luxembourg Art. L. 122-1, L. 122-5 Abs. 1, L. 122-9 Code du travail.
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does not mention: waiting periods to be observed before the job may be given
again to a person on a fixed-term contract.51 Moreover, in France the use of
another fixed-term contract with one and the same employee is only allowed after
a waiting period.52 For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that both
countries allow exceptions53 and that they both limit the duration of individual
contracts.54
5.2 MODEL 2
Model 2, adopted by Spain,55 combines the requirement of objective reasons
with the maximum duration of successive fixed-term contracts. Only three
reasons are accepted as objective reasons for a fixed-term contract, among
them a temporary increase in workload and the need to temporarily replace
an absent employee.56 The maximum duration of successive fixed-term con-
tracts is twenty-four months over a period of thirty months. However, this
limit does not apply to cases of temporary replacement.57 Model 2 is not
adopted exclusively by Spain. Sweden also adopts it, albeit only to limit
temporary replacements. In other cases of limitation for objective reasons,
Sweden adheres to model 4.58
5.3 MODEL 3
Model 3 does not require the employer to cite objective reasons. Instead, it
restricts the maximum duration of successive fixed-term contracts, as well as the
51 France: Art. L.1244-3, L.1244-4 Code du travail; Luxemburg: Art. L. 122-7 Code du travail.
52 Art. L.1244-1, L.1244-3 and L.1244-4 Code du travail.
53 Exceptions in France: Art. L.1244-4 Code du travail (exceptions regarding the waiting period for
occupation of the same workplace by a fixed-term employee), Art. L.1244-1, L.1244-3 and L.1244-4
Code du travail (exceptions regarding the waiting period for another fixed-term contract with the
same employee). Exceptions in Luxembourg: Art. L. 122-7 Code du travail.
54 In France Art. L.1242-8 Code du travail sets a limit of eighteen months. In Luxemburg the limit is
twenty-four months, Art. L. 122-4 Code du travail.
55 Art. 15.1 and 15.5 Estatuto de los Trabajadores.
56 Art. 15.1 Estatuto de los Trabajadores.
57 Art. 15.5 Estatuto de los Trabajadores. In contrast, Sweden and Belgium, both resorting to more than
one model, use model 2 in order to specifically limit fixed-term contracts with one and the same
employee for reasons of temporary replacement, otherwise refraining from time limits if the successive
fixed-term contracts are justified by objective reasons, Martina Berenbrinker & Sudabeh Kamanabrou,
Schweden, in Rechtsangleichung im Recht der Kettenbefristung in der EU 158–159 (Sudabeh Kamanabrou
ed., Mohr Siebeck 2016); AnjaSudabehKorth & Sudabeh Kamanabrou, Belgien, in Rechtsangleichung im
Recht der Kettenbefristung in der EU 433–434 (Sudabeh Kamanabrou ed., Mohr Siebeck 2016).
58 § 5 Lag om anställningsskydd, 1982:80. This section offers a third possibility as well: an employer may
use fixed-term contracts with one and the same employee for a total duration of two years within a
timeframe of five years.
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maximum number of renewals of such contracts. This model is adopted in the
Netherlands and Italy.59 In the Netherlands successive fixed-term contracts may
not exceed the number of three, nor a total duration of two years. A waiting
period of six months between two contracts breaks the continuity with the
result that the parties may once again conclude up to three contracts for a total
duration of twenty-four months.60 Italy sets a time limit of three years. Up to
this duration, the fixed-term contract may be renewed five times. If the parties
wish to conclude a new contract that is not a renewal of the original one, they
have to comply with a waiting period of ten or twenty days, depending on the
duration of the expiring contract.61
5.4 MODEL 4
Model 4 adopts only the requirement of objective reasons. It is applied in Austria,
Denmark and Finland.62 In none of these countries is the term ‘objective reasons’
conclusively regulated by law. Austria does not even provide examples. Finnish
law, however, clearly states that fixed-term contracts are to be used for temporary
requirements only.63 Model 4 is also adopted in Sweden. However, it is not used
exclusively but, as already stated, combined with model 2.64 In the Swedish
variation, model 4 comes with a closed list of objective reasons.65
5.5 MODEL 5
Model 5 lays down a limit on successive fixed-term contracts by restricting the
maximum duration as well as the number and renewal of such contracts. These
limitations are used cumulatively. Alternatively, the employer may cite objective
reasons for using successive fixed-term contracts. By means of this alternative
combination, the employer can avoid the need to state objective reasons for a
certain amount of time and a certain number of contracts or renewals. This model
is adopted in Germany and Poland and is also the standard model in Belgium.66
59 The Netherlands: Art. 7:668a Burgerlijk Wetboek; Italy: Art. 4 Abs. 1, 5 Abs. 4-bis Decreto
Legislativo 368/2001.
60 Art. 7:668a Burgerlijk Wetboek.
61 Art. 4 Abs. 1, 5 Abs. 3 and 5 Abs. 4-bis Decreto Legislativo 368/2001.
62 Finland: Ch. 1 § 3 Työsopimuslakia; Denmark: § 5 Lov om tidsbegrænste ansættelse; Austria: case law
based on § 879 Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch.
63 Ch. 1 § 3 para. 3 Työsopimuslakia.
64 See supra s. 5.2.
65 § 5 Lag om anställningsskydd, 1982:80.
66 Germany: § 14 Teilzeit- und Befristungsgesetz; Poland: Art. 251 Kodex pracy; Belgium: Art. 10, 10bis
Loi relatives aux contrats de travail.
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Unless there are objective reasons for the use of successive fixed-term
contracts, Polish law permits three fixed-term contracts for a total of thirty-
three months.67 Belgium and Germany allow four successive fixed-term con-
tracts for a total length of two years.68 In Germany, the successive contracts
must be renewals of the original contract.69 Also, according to the rulings of
the German Federal Labour Court a gap of three years disrupts continuity.70
In Belgium a minimum contractual period of three months has to be
observed.71
5.6 MODEL 6
Model 6, adopted in the United Kingdom, Ireland and Malta, combines two
measures alternatively. It limits the maximum duration of successive fixed-term
contracts, and this limit is set at four years in all three Member States. After
completion of this period, successive fixed-term contracts may only be concluded
if they are justified for objective reasons.72
6 THE BASIC CONCEPTS BEHIND THE REGULATORY MODELS
The regulatory models are based on two basic approaches: either they do not allow
successive fixed-term contracts without objective reasons, or they do not apply this
limit, but uses other restrictions. Opting for one or the other of these approaches
or for a combination is the first and fundamental question in regulating successive
fixed-term contracts. If a Member State requires objective reasons, it questions the
employer’s intention to conclude a limited contract. With this approach, fixed-
term contracts are the exception and may only be used ‘if necessary’. If, in contrast,
objective reasons are not required, the employer does not need to justify the
decision. Instead, he has to comply with restrictions concerning the total duration
and number of contracts. Neither of these two approaches is necessarily stricter or
more lenient than the other. The restrictive effect depends on the design of the
regulation in question and the specific needs of the employer.73
67 Art. 251 § 1 Kodex pracy.
68 Belgium: Art. 10bis § 2 Loi relatives aux contrats de travail; Germany: § 14 Abs. 2 S. 1 Teilzeit- und
Befristungsgesetz.
69 § 14 Abs. 2 S. 1 Teilzeit- und Befristungsgesetz.
70 7 AZR 716/09 – NZA 2011, 905, 906–911.
71 Art. 10bis § 2 Loi relative aux contrats de travail.
72 The United Kingdom: reg. 8 (1) - (3) Fixed-term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable
Treatment) Regulations 2002; Ireland: s. 9 Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act 2003;
Malta: Art. 7 para. 1 Contracts of Service for a Fixed Term Regulations.
73 Sudabeh Kamanabrou, supra n. 8, at 94.
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7 THE COMPARISON
Clause 5 of the framework agreement on fixed-term work aims to protect employ-
ees from the abuse of successive fixed-term contracts. Member States are not
obliged to set an absolute time limit. In addition, they are not obliged to limit
the use of fixed-term contracts for the same workplace or the same job. The
regulatory objective of clause 5 by which success in legislative approximation is to
be measured is the protection of the individual employee. Comparing the different
regulatory models it is important to bear in mind that the standard of assessment is
the minimum standard laid down by the framework agreement. If that standard of
protection is achieved by regulation, it does not matter whether another Member
State’s regulations grant a higher level of protection.74
7.1 MODELS COINCIDING WITH A BASIC CONCEPT
The comparative study shows that despite substantial differences in the details, the
level of protection in the Member States is essentially comparable. This applies,
first of all, to models 3 and 4 which each coincide with one of the basic approaches
in pure form. Although the basic approaches (in these two cases regulatory models
at the same time) ensure protection against abuse of successive fixed-term contracts
in different ways, it is not necessary to make the use of one or the other
compulsory to achieve approximation of the law.75 If the law demands justification
for objective reasons, a worker can only be employed on successive fixed-term
contracts for a long period of time, if the employer can repeatedly invoke objective
reasons. The framework agreement does not aim to prevent long-term employ-
ment relations based on fixed-term contracts if those contracts are justified by
objective reasons. In contrast with this mode of protection, a model which does
not refer to objective reasons but sets limits on the total duration and the number
of contracts does not put the employer under pressure to justify the intention to
conclude a temporary employment contract. On the other hand, the employer is
bound by rigid limits. If the limit on the total duration of successive fixed-term
contracts is absolute, long-term employment relations based on fixed-term con-
tracts cannot lawfully be established. If there is no absolute limit on the maximum
duration of successive fixed-term contracts, the interruption periods to be observed
provide a certain amount of protection against long-term employment relations
based on fixed-term contracts.
74 Ibid., at 107.
75 Ibid., at 109.
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7.2 MODELS WITH STRONGER PROTECTION
Regulatory models 1 and 2 require objective reasons, each adding one of the other
two measures of the framework agreement. Model 1 combines objective reasons
with a limit on renewals of fixed-term contracts, whereas model 2 combines
objective reasons with a limit on the total duration of successive fixed-term
contracts. These models provide stronger protection against the abuse of successive
fixed-term contracts than model 4, which lays down the requirement of objective
reasons only. However, this does not preclude the above-mentioned result of
approximation of law in connection with successive fixed-term contracts as for
this assessment the yardstick is, as stated above, the minimum standard laid down
by the framework agreement. If this minimum standard is ensured by a regulatory
model, discrepancies in the level of protection are of no account for the question
of approximation of law. This is all the more the case because models 1 and 2 do
not grant a significantly higher level of protection than model 4.76
7.3 ALTERNATIVE COMBINATIONS OF THE BASIC CONCEPTS
Whilst models 1 and 2 introduce additional measures to the requirement of
objective reasons, models 5 and 6 are combination models that allow successive
fixed-term contracts with or without objective reasons. Thus the employer can
conclude successive fixed-term contracts more freely than under models 3 and 4,
which each coincide with one of the basic concepts. This applies even more to the
comparison of models 5 and 6 to models 1 and 2, which introduce additional
measures to the requirement of objective reasons. The Member States adopting
model 5 allow fixed-term contracts without objective reasons for a period of two
years, and in one case for thirty-three months. Additionally, they place a limit on
the number of contracts or renewals that may be concluded within this period.
Further fixed-term contracts between the same parties may be concluded only if
justified by objective reasons.77 Model 6 allows employers to conclude successive
fixed-term contracts for up to four years without justification for objective reasons.
The number of contracts or renewals in that period is unlimited. After four years,
further fixed-term contracts need to be justified by objective reasons.78
Combination models of this kind are not to be rejected from the outset. They
are basically compatible with the framework agreement, leaving a wide margin for
national regulations. Nevertheless, with view to approximation of law a
76 Ibid., at 111.
77 See supra s. 5.5.
78 See supra s. 5.6.
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combination model granting a significantly lower level of protection than other
regulatory models is open to criticism. In this respect, the permissible maximum
duration of successive fixed-term contracts as well as the rules on waiting periods
between such contracts prove to be a problem.79
Models combining the basic concepts alternatively offer less protection against
abuse of successive fixed-term contracts than the other models simply because they
allow such contracts with and without justification for objective reasons. If such a
combination model then allows a generous maximum duration for successive
fixed-term contracts without the need for justification for objective reasons, the
level of protection is significantly lower than that of other models. The two models
with alternative combinations adopted in the Member States covered by the study
lay down maximum periods of two to four years. The Member States adopting
model 5 lay down a limit of twenty-four months for successive fixed-term con-
tracts without justification for objective reasons, and in one case the limit is thirty-
three months.80 With these limits, model 5 is not much more liberal than models 1
to 4. The level of protection of the five models is still comparable. Some differ-
ences have to be accepted, as the framework agreement allows combination
models and does not set specific limits for such combination models.81
The level of protection is, however, considerably lower with model 6. With
this model, the employer may conclude successive fixed-term contracts without
justification by objective reasons for a period of four years. Afterwards additional
contracts may be concluded if justified by objective reasons. The gap between this
model and the other models results from two factors: the combination of fixed-
term contracts with and without justification for objective reasons, and the gener-
ous legal framework. It is not the possibility to conclude successive fixed-term
contracts for a period of four years in itself that is the key difference between
model 6 and the other models. It is the combination with the possibility to
conclude additional fixed-term contracts citing objective reasons that practically
halves the level of protection in comparison with models 3 and 4 which each use
only one of the two basic concepts.82 Furthermore, one Member State using
model 6 is not particularly strict with regard to interruptions: in the United
Kingdom – still a member of the EU – an interruption of a week is sufficient to
break continuity of employment. The four-year period for successive fixed-term
contracts without justification begins anew after such an interruption. While the
broad timeframe of model 6 keeps the level of protection low, this is exacerbated
79 Sudabeh Kamanabrou, supra n. 8, at 111–115.
80 See supra s. 5.5.
81 Sudabeh Kamanabrou, supra n. 8, at 112–114.
82 Ibid., at 113.
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by loose rules on interruptions allowing almost unrestricted recourse to successive
fixed-term contracts.83
7.4 REASONS FOR THE CHOICE OF A PARTICULAR MODEL
It would be interesting to ascertain why the Member States chose their respective
models. However, this information appears to be unobtainable. The Member
States’ choice of regulatory model was neither commented on in the legislative
materials – as far as they exist – nor discussed in the literature. This is particularly
evident in cases where the law on successive fixed-term contracts has been sub-
stantially amended in recent years. Such a complete change, which includes
adopting a different model, has occurred in Italy and Poland. Italy started out
with an exhaustive list of objective reasons and then added the possibility of
concluding fixed-term contracts without objective reasons.84 Finally, Italy set
aside the limitation for objective reasons and adopted the current regulation: a
total duration of three years combined with a limit on the total number of renewals
to five.85 In Poland, originally the third fixed-term contract concluded by the same
parties was deemed to be a contract for an indefinite period in the case of contracts
concluded within a month of each other.86 This was amended in 2016, when the
current rule based on model 5 was implemented.87 In both countries the change of
model was not discussed or explained. It may have been due to a desire for a
noticeable change or simply due to political compromise: one can only speculate
on the reasons. It is known that the change in Poland was motivated by
implementation deficits,88 whereas Italy took legislative action to reduce
unemployment.89 However, the intention to introduce stricter or more lenient
rules – whatever its motivation – does not explain a change of models, as shown by
the example of the Netherlands. With the reform of 2015, the Dutch legislature
aimed to tackle unemployment at the same time as the long-term use of
flexible working arrangements. Nevertheless, it did not change the regulatory
model but made the existing rules stricter instead.90 This confirms the above-stated
83 Ibid., at 114–115.
84 For the history of the legislation see Lina Franziska Ebeling & Sudabeh Kamanabrou, Italien, in
Rechtsangleichung im Recht der Kettenbefristung in der EU 597–600 (Sudabeh Kamanabrou ed., Mohr
Siebeck 2016).
85 See supra s. 5.3.
86 For the history of the legislation see Joanna Rupa & Sudabeh Kamanabrou, Polen, in Rechtsangleichung
im Recht der Kettenbefristung in der EU 341–343 (Sudabeh Kamanabrou ed., Mohr Siebeck 2016).
87 See supra s. 5.5.
88 Joanna Rupa & Sudabeh Kamanabrou, supra n. 86, at 343–344.
89 Lina Franziska Ebeling & Sudabeh Kamanabrou, supra n. 84, at 600.
90 Sandra Wullenkord & Sudabeh Kamanabrou, Niederlande, in Rechtsangleichung im Recht der
Kettenbefristung in der EU 379, 380–382 (Sudabeh Kamanabrou ed., Mohr Siebeck 2016).
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claim91 that the level of protection does not depend on the choice of regulatory
model, but rather on the specific design of the chosen model.
One might expect the use of the same model by members of the same legal
family, but such an expectation proves to be unfounded. Although it comes as no
surprise that France and Luxembourg on the one hand and the United Kingdom
and Ireland on the other adopt the same model, since France and Luxembourg
belong to the Roman family and the United Kingdom and Ireland to the common
law family, corresponding groupings cannot be found among the other Member
States. For example, Belgium, Italy and Spain belong to the Roman family as well,
but do not adopt the regulatory model adopted by France and Luxembourg.
Rather, they each chose a different regulatory model with the result that there
are no ‘family likenesses’ in the Roman family. Austria and Germany, both
belonging to the Germanic family, do not share a model either. In the Nordic
family Denmark and Finland do, whereas Sweden adopts a mixed model.
With regard to choices it must finally be noted that only four of the Member
States included in the study had to take major legislative steps to implement the
directive. Most of the Member States drafted their rules before clause 5 of the
ETUC-UNICE-CEEP framework agreement entered into force. It may be assumed
that their regulations influenced the design of clause 5 rather than the other way round.
7.5 INTERIM CONCLUSION
As an interim conclusion, the level of protection against abuse of successive fixed-term
contracts in the Member States included in the study is largely comparable. Only
model 6 grants a significantly lower level of protection than the other fivemodels. This
is due to the fact that this model not only combines fixed-term contracts with and
without justification but sets a generous timeframe for such contracts without setting
any limits on the number of contracts during this period. The gap increases in those
varieties of model 6 that extend the possibilities of successive fixed-term contracts
without justification by generous rules on interruptions.
8 MODIFICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT
Rules on interruptions compromising the objective of the framework agreement
on fixed-term work are not compatible with this framework agreement. Member
States must not set rules impairing its practical effect.92 With regard to this
deficiency of national regulation, an amendment to the legislation in question
91 See supra ss 7.1–7.3.
92 Case C-378/07, Angelidaki, ECR 2009, I-3071, para. 155; Case C-212/04, Adeneler, ECR 2006,
I-6057, para. 82.
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would suffice.93 As the United Kingdom is the Member State concerned, the
problem will most likely be resolved by its decision to leave the EU.
Apart from this point, it is not clear how model 6 should be assessed with
regard to the framework agreement on fixed-term work. It may on the one hand
be deemed permissible considering the loose specifications of the framework. On
the other hand, it can be argued that an alternative combination designed in such a
fashion does not achieve the objective of the framework agreement. The question
of successful legislative approximation does not, however, depend on whether or
not the national law is in accordance with the directive or not. If model 6 with
adequate rules on interruptions is not in accordance with the directive, it is a point
of criticism that model 6 is in any case covered by the wording of the framework
agreement. If model 6 with adequate rules on interruptions is in accordance with
the directive, this confirms the impression that the framework agreement led to
considerable legislative approximation while there are still notable exceptions.94 In
order to achieve a more comprehensive effect, the framework agreement should be
slightly adjusted so that the maximum duration of successive fixes-term contracts
has to be less than four years. By this modification, the level of protection of model
6 would be adjusted to that of the other models. This limitation of the timeframe
should be established for all models using alternative combinations, i.e. models 5
and 6. While it is true that model 5 is currently adopted with moderate timeframes
only and that the number of contracts permissible within the set period is limited as
well, as a model with an alternative combination it still has the potential to
undermine the successful legislative approximation of the law on successive
fixed-term employment contracts if it is used with a longer timeframe.95
Model 5 limits the timeframe as well as the number of contracts. Those limits
have to be viewed as a whole. Thus, as a maximum timeframe for model 5, the
Polish limit of thirty-three months is appropriate if the number of contracts
permissible during this period is limited to three (and the number of renewals to
two). If the number of contracts is greater, the timeframe should be shorter.96 As
model 6 applies only a timeframe to limit successive fixed-term contracts that are
not based on objective reasons its timeframe should be shorter than that of model
5. In this case, two years are adequate.97 Even with this restriction, model 6 is still
more generous than the German and the Belgian variations of model 5, both using
this timeframe and additionally limiting the number of contracts or renewals. As a
uniform level of protection against abuse of successive fixed-term contracts is not
93 Sudabeh Kamanabrou, supra n. 8, at 115.
94 Ibid., at 116.
95 Ibid., at 116.
96 Ibid., at 117.
97 Ibid., at 117.
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the aim of the framework agreement and the limitation of model 6 is proposed
solely to eliminate significant differences in the level of protection, the two-year
timeframe for model 6 is sufficient to move towards legislative approximation.
9 CONCLUSION
In order to prevent abuse of successive fixed-term contracts the framework agree-
ment on fixed-term work proposes three types of measures to be used either
individually or in combination by the Member States. These provisions have
resulted in quite different regulations in the fifteen Member States included in
the study on legislative approximation in the EU regarding successive fixed-term
contracts.
These Member States adopt eight different regulatory models, six of which
were analysed in the study. The remaining two models were negligible as they are
each adopted in one Member State only and merely as a complementary measure.
In light of the loosely framed framework agreement, this diversity of regulatory
measures was to be expected.
By contrast, the results of the comparison are surprising. The study showed
that for the Member States under examination, the legislative approximation in the
field of successive fixed-term contracts has been largely successful since, in the
actual designs adopted by the Member States, five of the six models offer a
comparable level of protection. Rather, it was to be expected that the respective
regulations would be too diverse to ensure comparable standards in the Member
States. This assumption was not confirmed. Admittedly, the level of protection
against abuse of successive fixed-term contracts is rather low but that is due to the
fact that the framework agreement can offer protection only within the limits of its
provisions. Within these limits legislative approximation has been achieved with
the exception of those Member States adopting model 6. Three of the fifteen
Member States included in the study adopt this model, thus offering a compara-
tively low level of protection. Nevertheless, legislative approximation has by and
large succeeded. The diminished level of protection is limited to one model only: a
slight alteration to the framework agreement would eliminate this problem.
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